We set up a model which captures the spatial dimension of international fisheries in legal (i.e. internationally accessible high seas versus state-owned exclusive economic zones) and biological (i.e. various intensities of fish migration between zones) terms. We compare the success of regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs) for consistent and various forms of inconsistent management options, related to limitations of scope and compatibility of measures. While the performance of an RFMO declines in the presence of inconsistent management, participation might improve as free-riding becomes less attractive and the overall net effect may well be positive. This suggests to first broaden participation before deepening fishery treaties.
Introduction
Managing global and international commons requires voluntary international cooperation due to the absence of a supranational institution that could enforce a cooperative management strategy. While, in general, a tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, internationally shared fish resources seem to be particularly vulnerable to overexploitation. 1 In an attempt to address this problem, state-owned property rights have been established under the legal regime of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; see UN 1982) . According to Articles 56 and 57 of the Convention, every coastal state has the right to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), adjacent to its territorial waters, extending 200 nautical miles into the sea, in which it exercises sovereign rights regarding the management of all (living and non-living) marine resources. Beyond the EEZs, in the high seas, the open access regime persists, i.e.
resources are subject to the exploitation by all nations (Art. 87).
Despite this large-scale allocation of property rights, many commercially valuable fish stocks are still exploited (and overexploited) by more than one fishing nation because they either occur in the high seas and/or migrate through more than one jurisdictional area. 2 Addressing this problem requires a comprehensive and consistent international management of shared fish stocks. International marine law recognizes this need for international coordination and cooperation. Art. 63 and Art. 64 of the UNCLOS call for a cooperative management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, either directly through bilateral negotiations or through the development of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This call for cooperation is repeated by the UN 1 For a documentation of the state of internationally shared fish resources, see Maguire et al. (2006) .
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The common classification of shared fish stocks (cf. Munro et al. 2004, p. 3) is as follows:
transboundary stocks inhabit (or cross) the EEZs of two or more coastal states, highly migratory stocks are to be found both within the EEZs and the adjacent high seas and are highly migratory in nature, straddling stocks also cover both EEZs and the high seas but are more stationary, discrete high seas stocks occur only in the high seas.
Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 (UN 1995) which deals explicitly with the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
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While there is a broad consensus in the international community that the management of shared fish stocks requires a cooperative approach, the details have been controversial during the negotiations preceding many fishery agreements. The undisputed sovereignty of coastal states with respect to the management of intra-EEZ resources obviously conflicts with the aim of a consistent management of shared fish stocks across the entire geographical area of their occurrence. The UNCLOS in 1982 calls for cooperation "both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone" (Art. 64 (1)) in the case of highly migratory species, whereas for straddling stocks Art. 63(2) only requires a cooperative management in the high seas. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 restates this distinction (Art. 7(1)) and emphasizes both the sovereignty of coastal states regarding intra-EEZ fishery management but also the importance of the compatibility of conservation measures at the same time (Art. 7(2)). Accordingly, most currently existing
RFMOs confine the area of actual management to the high seas, but call for a compatibility of intra-EEZ and high seas management measures, though they remain vague how this compatibility shall be achieved. Highly migratory species are listed in Annex I of the UNCLOS and include most tuna species, as well as marlins and swordfish. Examples of straddling stocks include for instance the commercially valuable stocks of the Alaskan Pollock and the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring. 4 The ambiguity inherent in Art. 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995 leaves room for several interpretations. While Oude Elferink (2001) argues that it should be interpreted as favouring neither coastal states nor RFMO management authorities, Molenaar (2005) clearly supports the position of many coastal states which claim priority and sovereignty for coastal fisheries management. The latter position is sometimes referred to as the bottom-up approach, in contrast to a top-down approach which gives priority to RFMO management (Örebech et al. 1998) . Based on an analysis of the aforementioned Art. 7, Goltz (1995) concludes that priority will depend on the specific circumstances. In order to avoid conflicts, some RFMOs simply ignore this issue. For instance, a recent performance review criticized that the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) "has not taken any measure aimed at ensuring the compatibility between conservation and management measures adopted by a coastal State with respect to the areas under its jurisdiction and those adopted by ICCAT" (Hurry et al. 2008, p. 16 Regarding fishing in the EEZ of a member state, the NEAFC Commission has only limited influence. First, it can only make recommendations if the coastal state in question requests this. Second the coastal state has to approve the recommendations in order for them to become effective (Art. 6(1)).
fishery management. It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the success of RFMOs in such a strategic setting and under the restriction that RFMOs have to be self-enforcing. In particular, we are interested in comparing the performance of RFMOs with consistent to those with inconsistent management strategies.
In a strategic setting the outcome of such a comparison is not obvious for at least two reasons. First, due to strategic interaction between fishing nations, either as an RFMO member or non-member, what is optimal at the individual level does not necessarily have to be optimal at the aggregate level and vice versa. 6 Second, even if a departure from a first-best management strategy negatively impacts on economic rents, this may be compensated by higher participation in an RFMO.
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A less ambitious management strategy may buy more participation which may improve the overall performance of an RFMO. Whereas it is straightforward to define consistent management, the possibilities of second-best designs are numerous. In order to test the robustness of our conclusions, we will consider two versions of inconsistent management strategies related to the scope of cooperation and the compatibility of measures.
The issue at stake requires an approach that captures two essential features of international fisheries simultaneously. First, we have to set up a bioeconomic model which captures different geographical areas (high seas and EEZs) and the migration of fish stocks across zones. Second, we require a coalition formation model which tests for stability of RFMOs. In the literature on fishery economics such an integrated approach is missing so far. The first aspect is dealt with in several papers considering the exploitation 6 For instance, in the context of climate change, uncertainty and learning, Kolstad (2007) , Finus and Pintassilgo (2012) and Na and Shin (1998) show that no learning may lead to better global outcomes than learning due to strategic interaction across players.
In the context of global emissions, such countervailing effects have been described by Barrett (2002) ("consensus versus focal treaty") and Finus and Rundshagen (1998) ("majority versus unanimity voting") in a repeated game framework and by Finus and Maus (2008) , who call it "modesty versus ambition" in a coalition formation model of the type we use in this paper. See also more recently Courtois and Haeringer (2012) on the trade-off between environmental treaty objectives and participation.
of a migratory fish stock by two or more competing fishing nations (e.g. McKelvey et al. 2002 , Hannesson 1997 , Naito and Polasky 1997 , and Arnason et al. 2000 . These papers typically consider the Nash equilibrium outcome in a competitive game and demonstrate its inefficiency by contrasting it with the outcome of a fully cooperative management scheme. They do not, however, examine the stability and success of coalitions, and if so, they only test for stability of the grand coalition but not of partially cooperative agreements. Also on the second aspect there exists an extensive literature on international fishery coalitions which can be broadly divided into two categories (for an overview, see Lindroos et al. 2007 ). Most of the early papers apply cooperative game theory to examine the implications of various sharing rules such as the Shapley value under full cooperation (e.g. Lindroos 1998 and Duarte et al. 2000) . This approach, however, does not allow studying the impact of free-riding explicitly. This requires concepts from noncooperative coalition theory, first applied by Pintassilgo (2003) to the analysis of international fisheries. In a similar paper, Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) conclude that the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is the only stable outcome whenever the number of fishing nations exceeds two. However, these papers confine their analysis to one zone; hence migration does not matter. Our work extends Finus et al. (2011) , who incorporate different geographical zones and migration into the analysis of international fishery coalitions, by including suboptimal management strategies.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bioeconomic model, which is an extension of the Gordon-Schaefer model accounting for different geographical zones and migration. Section 3 deals with the economic behavior of countries. It introduces the coalition formation model and the various scenarios of consistent and inconsistent fishery management strategies. Section 4 details our solving procedure and outlines the model and parameter specifications. Sections 5 and 6 discuss our results and section 7 concludes.
The Model

Preliminaries
The analysis of cooperation in international fisheries requires concepts from biology in order to describe the biological processes of the fish stock (e.g. growth and migration patterns), has to take into account the legal framework of international marine law, and should capture the essential features of economic behavior of the protagonists in the "fishery game". The biological part is based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon 1954 and Schaefer 1954) 
The Biological and Spatial Dimension
We assume that a given number of fishing nations N exploit a shared fishery resource which is characterized by an intrinsic reproduction process. The steady state of the fish stock in the classical Gordon-Schaefer-model is described by the following equation:
Eq. (1)  of the habitat of the resource is subject to access by all fishing nations and define:
Hence, in our context, players are sovereign countries engaging in fishing, i.e. coastal states, each owning an EEZ with exclusive fishing rights, but they can also fish in the high seas. The vector of fish stocks,
, describes the population in each zone. The modified steady-state condition (1) then reads:
where the term DX accounts for the migration of fish stocks across zones with D a diffusion matrix which is explained in more detail below. The components of the growth E . Due to the migratory behavior of fish stocks, harvest from each zone generally depends on all fishing efforts.
The Economic Dimension
Introduction
Within the framework of international fisheries, each fishing nation has to decide whether to join an RFMO or not, and it has to choose the level of fishing effort for its fleet. 
, where S is the set of n coalition members, and (N-n) 1 is the vector of N n  singletons. Given the simple structure of the first stage, a coalition structure is fully characterized by coalition S .
In the second stage, players choose their economic strategies which are fishing efforts in our bioeconomic model. The standard assumption is that the coalition members cooperate among each other, maximizing the aggregate payoff to the coalition whereas all nonmembers maximize their individual payoffs. The simultaneous solution of these maximization tasks leads to an equilibrium vector of fishing efforts   
where p is the (exogenously) given fish price and
Note that all stocks and therefore payoffs depend on the entire vector of fishing efforts due to the process of migration that links the various fishing grounds. For notational convenience, we will omit the arguments in the payoff functions subsequently.
In the following, we have a closer look at the two-stage game which is solved backward.
Our main focus in this paper and the departure from the standard assumption is related to the second stage where we distinguish between consistent and two versions of inconsistent fishery management. However, because second stage outcomes affect equilibrium payoffs, this will also affect the choice of membership in the first stage.
Second Stage of the Game: the Choice of Fishing Efforts
Consistent Management
A consistent management requires that each player, including the coalition with signatories as a kind of meta-player (Haeringer 2004) as well as all non-signatories as singletons, maximize an objective function comprising payoffs obtained from fishing in the high seas and from the exclusive economic zones.
Non-signatories:
, ,
max
Signatories:
The difference between signatories and signatories is that the former maximize their individual payoff whereas the latter maximize the aggregate payoff across all coalition members. Hence, equilibrium fishing efforts, as derived from (4) and (5), form a Nash equilibrium in a game between outsiders and the coalition. This is sometimes called a coalitional Nash equilibrium in order to distinguish it from an ordinary Nash equilibrium with which it coincides if coalition S is empty or comprises only one player. Moreover, if coalition S comprises all players,
, the coalitional Nash equilibrium corresponds to the socially optimal fishing vector. Hence, the entire range from no cooperation, partial cooperation to full cooperation can be captured with this approach.
Consistent, in contrast to inconsistent management, means in particular two things. In terms of the scope of cooperation, the coalition extends cooperation beyond the high seas and includes the EEZs. De facto, this implies that coalition members fully concede their sovereignty to the governing body of the RFMO. In terms of the compatibility of measures, all players fully realize the interaction between fishing efforts in the high seas and the exclusive economic zones and vice versa. 
Inconsistent Management -Restricted Scope of Cooperation
As pointed out by Molenaar (2005) and Oude Elferink (2001), many coastal states are unwilling to give up their national sovereignty with respect to intra-EEZ fishery management. Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction, the sovereignty of coastal states is commonly recognized as undisputable and the legal framework in international fisheries is not always clear about the scope of cooperation required in RFMOs. In order to capture the possibility of a restricted scope of cooperation in a systematic and simple way, we replace conditions (4) and (5) by the following three conditions:
where [0, 1]   denotes the scope parameter. The first condition describes nonsignatories' non-cooperative behavior, which is unaffected by the scope of cooperation.
Accordingly, conditions (4) and (6) are identical. In contrast, condition (7) captures the idea that the decision about intra-EEZ fishing remains with the coastal state even if a country decides to become a member of an RFMO. A coalition member may not take full account of the impacts on the stocks in the high seas and the EEZs of other coalition members when choosing its fishing effort in its EEZ. Specifically, a coalition member, when choosing fishing efforts in his own EEZ, maximizes his individual payoff, which is the sum of the payoff from his own EEZ,
, and from the high seas, , HS i  , plus a share  of the payoffs of the other coalition members, which is the last sum. Hence,  describes the scope of cooperation. One interpretation is that  captures the extent by which a signatory takes into account the payoffs of his coalition partners when choosing fishing efforts in his own EEZs. Another interpretation is that  captures the extent by which the RFMO can control fishing in the EEZs. Condition (8)   implies full scope of cooperation and accordingly, condition (7) and (8) merge into condition (5). It is important to note that a restricted scope of cooperation does not mean incompatibility of measures as assumed in our next scenario. In (7) RFMO members behave fully rationally in their EEZs as they are aware that fishing in their own EEZ will affect their payoff derived from the high seas and in (8) they understand that fishing in the high seas will impact on their EEZ stocks (and hence payoffs).
Inconsistent Management -The Incompatibility of Measures
The second scenario captures the idea of incompatibility of measures. This acknowledges the fact that though compatibility of measures is called for in many international fisheries agreements (e.g. in Art. 7 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement), it is usually insufficiently implemented, especially if a fishing nation puts the management of intra-EEZ and high seas fisheries under the control of different national authorities (see Arbuckle et al. 2006, p. 36) . A simple way of modeling this is to assume that the coalition as well as non-signatories only partially account for their payoffs from the high seas when determining optimal fishing efforts in the EEZs and vice versa:
Non-signatories: 
The compatibility parameter [0, 1]   describes the degree of compatibility of measures.
Condition (9) and (10) define the maximization behavior of non-signatories whereas condition (11) and (12)   corresponds to fully compatible measures, i.e. conditions (9) to (12) collapse into conditions (4) and (5), our consistent scenario. Non-signatories are assumed to implement always the same degree of compatibility as signatories for simplicity.
Computations
Viewed together, regardless whether we consider a consistent or one of the inconsistent management scenarios in the second stage, the solution of the respective first order conditions (together with the steady-state conditions eq. (1') of the biological equilibrium) leads to an equilibrium vector of fishing efforts which allows to determine steady-state stocks (eq. (1')) and equilibrium payoffs (eq. (3)).
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Each scenario can be viewed as a clear instruction how to choose fishing efforts in the second stage, given some coalition S has formed in the first stage. Hence, in order to simplify the following notation, we can replace
 .
First Stage of the Game: Membership Decisions
For the first stage, we use the equilibrium concept of internal and external stability, i.e. a coalition S is considered to be stable if it fulfills the following two conditions:
8 This implies to compute ex-post payoffs. This keeps with the tradition of other papers modelling different economic behaviour through different objective functions, but using the "true" welfare function for evaluation. See for instance Finus and Maus (2008) and Hoel (1991) .
Internal Stability
No member i S  finds it profitable to deviate, i.e. the gain i G from leaving the coalition is non-positive:
External Stability
No non-member j S  finds it profitable to join the coalition, i.e. the gain j Q from joining the coalition is non-positive: 0
Note that the incentives i G and j Q depend on the coalition structure, the scope and compatibility parameters  and  as well as other parameters of the model (see subsection 4.1). The grand coalition is externally stable by definition as there is no outsider left that could join the coalition. Moreover, the coalition structure comprising only singletons is stable by definition, which ensures existence of a stable coalition structure. This follows from the fact that the singleton coalition structure can be supported as an equilibrium if all players announce not to be a member of the coalition, i.e. S   , and hence a single deviation by one player will make no difference.
Solving Procedure and Model Specifications
Preliminaries
In general, solving the second stage of the game requires solving a system of 3 1 N  equations ( 2N economic FOCs and 1 N  biological steady-state equations) for N optimal intra-EEZ efforts
, N optimal high seas efforts
.., X , X . As optimal efforts in the second stage of the game depend on stock levels and vice versa, they all have to be determined simultaneously. Obviously, any solution will depend on the specification of the functional relationship between stocks, efforts and payoffs. That is, we have to specify growth, harvest and cost functions and define a dispersal matrix which describes the migration process. This is done in subsection 4.2. Due to migration, the model is significantly more complex than the standard Gordon-Schaefer model and cannot be solved analytically any more. Therefore we have to rely on numerical simulations of which the underlying assumptions are described in subsection 4.3.
Functional Specification
The functional relationships underlying our model are summarized in Table 1 . It will be apparent that the specifications follow the mainstream assumptions in the literature.
[ Table 1 about here ]
The most commonly used growth function (Table 1 , first row) is of the logistic type where i r denotes the intrinsic growth rate in zone i .
Regarding the harvest function (Table 1 , second row), we have to bear in mind that all countries are allowed to fish in the high seas whereas only the owner of an EEZ is allowed to fish in this territory. As commonly assumed, (total) harvest depends linearly on (total) fishing efforts and stock densities, with i q denoting the catchability coefficient, a measure of the technical efficiency of the fishing fleet i .
Two aspects need to be considered when specifying the migration process. 9 First, the arrangement of zones has to be specified, i.e. which zones are connected through diffusion. We choose an intuitive and symmetric arrangement of the 1 N  zones: the EEZs are arranged in a circle with the high seas at its center. This avoids boundary effects that would emerge with a linear arrangement and represents a good first-order approximation for the geographical setting of many examples where an area of high seas is surrounded by coastal zones. A perfect match of this assumption is for instance the 'Banana Hole' in the Northeast Atlantic or the 'Donut Hole' in the Bering Sea (see Meltzer 1994 ).
Second, we have to define what determines the intensity of migration between two neighboring fishing grounds. We assume a density-dependent diffusion process, i.e. the strength of migration between neighboring fishing grounds is given by the difference in 9 For an extensive discussion of our and alternative assumptions see Finus et al. (2011). stock densities, scaled by the product of the sizes of zones (Kvamsdal and Groves 2008, This description of the diffusion process ensures the conservation of biomass in the absence of harvest and growth, i.e. whatever leaves zone i for zone j arrives in zone j without any losses. Furthermore, it reflects the assumption that the intensity and direction of dispersal only depends on the difference in stock densities between zones. The diffusion parameter ij d is an indicator for the intensity of diffusion from zone i to zone j .
It is a common assumption in the literature on fishery management (Gordon 1954 , Pezzey et al. 2000 and Sanchirico and Wilen 1999 that costs (Table 1, fourth row) depend linearly on extraction efforts, though they are strictly convex if expressed in terms of harvest levels where i c is the (constant) marginal cost of fishing effort of the fishing fleet of country i .
Simulations
Simulations require the assumption of numerical values for the parameters of the model.
Fortunately, a closer look at the system of equations reveals that results will depend on only few parameters. The choice of parameter values follows good practice, covering a large parameter space as summarized in Table II. [ Table II about here ]
First, note that in order to save on computational time, we concentrate on the case of three players ( 3 N  ), which, admittedly, is the minimum number of players to study coalition formation but, as we will see, is already sufficient to obtain interesting insights into the incentive structure of cooperative arrangements. For N 3  , we have to consider three possible coalition structures, namely the grand coalition, the two-player coalitions, and the all-singletons coalition structure. Furthermore, we restrict the analysis to symmetric parameter values, both with respect to the biological and economic
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To see that the entries of the diffusion matrix (Table 1 , third row) do indeed imply the described diffusion process, consider the entries of the vector DX , which is relevant in eq. (1').
parameters.
11
Consequently, all possible two-player coalitions are equivalent with symmetric payoffs for coalition members, though they differ from the payoff of a nonmember. The assumption of symmetric players is widespread in the literature on coalition formation, not only on international environmental treaties but also in the context of other economic problems (see e.g. Bloch 2003, and Yi 2003 for an overview). This assumption allows us to focus on the main issues of the paper, namely the effect of the scope and compatibility of measures on the success of RFMOs. Note that for symmetric players it is natural to assume an equal sharing of the coalitional payoff. from the allocation parameter  and the total carrying capacity tot k (see section 2.2, equation (2) 
Results: The Scope of Cooperation
In this section, we discuss the impact of a restricted scope of cooperation, first with respect to the second stage of the game, i.e. fishing efforts, stocks and payoffs, then with respect to the first stage of the game, i.e. membership decisions. Finally, we pull both stages together.
Second Stage of Coalition Formation
In the second stage, equilibrium fishing efforts, stocks, and payoffs depend on the scope parameter  for every possible coalition structure. In the following, we omit the term 'equilibrium' for notational convenience.
b) The quantitative impact of a marginal variation of the scope parameter  on total efforts, stocks and payoffs increases in the diffusion parameter d .
Result 1a conforms to intuition regarding the grand coalition. In the absence of strategic interaction, any restriction of the scope of cooperation reduces the biological effectiveness of a cooperative agreement (i.e. higher fishing efforts and hence lower stocks), and decreases payoffs. As  approaches 0, the outcome under the grand coalition approaches that under no cooperation. Less obvious is that this also holds under the twoplayer coalition with strategic interaction between the coalition and the outsider. The reason is that the smaller the scope of cooperation (the smaller  ), the larger are coalitional fishing efforts which are only partially compensated by lower fishing efforts of the outsider. That is, though reaction functions are negatively sloped, slopes are less than 1 in absolute terms. Hence, conceding costal states sovereignty in intra-EEZ fishery management threatens the success of a given RFMO, leading to lower aggregate payoffs and higher stocks. In terms of aggregate payoffs, this is illustrated with an example in Table III. [ Table III about here ] Result 1b stresses the significance of diffusion. The negative impact of a restricted scope of cooperation, both in terms of the biological effectiveness and economic success of an RFMO, is more pronounced when stocks are highly mobile. Thus, the strong emphasis on a fully integrated fishery management in the particular case of highly migratory species, as expressed in the UNCLOS in 1982 and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, is supported by our findings, at least as long as we abstract from the stability of agreements, related to the first stage of coalition formation, which we consider now.
First Stage of Coalition Formation
Now we investigate how the scope of cooperation affects the stability of coalitions.
Before considering the impact of a restricted scope of cooperation   Regarding a two-player coalition, there is a small parameter range for which cooperation can be stable. Specifically, assuming all parameters at their base value ( 0.5 c  and 0.5 r  ), the two-player coalition is unstable whenever 0 02
, but may be stable for smaller values. The intuition is that there are two countervailing forces at work.
On the one hand, the stronger the externality across players and zones, i.e. the larger the proportion  of the common pool resource compared to the exclusively state-owned EEZs, and the larger diffusion d , the larger would be the gains from cooperation and hence the more valuable would be cooperation. On the other hand, with increasing  and d , also the incentive to free-ride sharply increases. Overall, the two-player coalition will only be stable if  and d are sufficiently small. Considering a restricted scope of cooperation changes this result. The intuition behind Result 2 is that countries are more willing to join an RFMO if they can keep full or partial national sovereignty over intra-EEZ fishery management. This enables them to derive a larger exclusive benefit in their EEZs from the conservation measures implemented by the RFMO in the high seas. In other words, within their EEZs coalition members are partially allowed to free-ride on the cooperative efforts of the RFMO in which they participate. Hence, we conclude that a departure from first-bestbeing less ambitious -may buy larger stable membership in RFMOs.
Overall Result
Second stage outcomes, Result 1, and first stage outcomes, Result 2, revealed two countervailing tendencies associated with a reduction in the scope of cooperation. Not surprisingly, combining both results only allows for a very general statement (Result 3), though the subsequent representative example and statistics are quite revealing.
Result 3: The Scope of Cooperation and the Overall Success of Coalitions
Restricting the scope of cooperation, i.e. departing from the value 1   , can be welfareimproving.
For instance, consider again the example in Table III . Without restriction of the scope of cooperation, 1   , the highest aggregate payoff of a stable coalition is generated by a two-player coalition (with a welfare level of 97.3%). For 1   , the grand coalition is not stable. Testing whether an improvement over this outcome is possible means to lower  to a point which just allows stabilizing the grand coalition. In the example, this requires to lower  to a value of 0. Table II) , we find that in 15% of the cases a restricted scope leads to better outcomes than a full scope; if an improvement is possible, the "optimal scope" leads to the grand coalition in 92 % of the cases and to the two player coalition in 8% of the cases, with an average optimal scope of 0.7   . Hence, we can conclude that a departure from first-best may well be rational, though the socially optimal welfare level can never be obtained which necessarily requires to set 1   and the inclusion of all players.
Results: The Compatibility of Measures
We now turn to the second scenario of inconsistent management which we have defined above as an incompatibility of measures. Again, we follow the sequence of backward induction.
Second Stage of Coalition Formation
First, note that for the two extreme assumptions 0   (only EEZs and no high seas) and Result 4a stresses the biological and economic importance of the compatibility of intra-EEZ and high seas fishery management, irrespective of the number of cooperating countries. As the compatibility parameter  affects both signatories' and nonsignatories' behavior, it also has an impact on the outcome under the all-singletons coalition structure. Neglecting the need for compatibility leads to a rise in aggregate fishing efforts, a decline in stocks and thereby decreasing aggregate payoffs. An example in Table IV [ Table IV about here ]
Result 4b points to the fact that the compatibility of measures is more important in the case of highly migratory stocks (high value of d ) where fishing in one zone creates a stronger externality on stocks in neighboring zones than in the case of straddling stocks (low value of d ).
First Stage of Coalition Formation
Recall that the all-singletons coalition structure is stable by definition for all parameter values and that the grand coalition is only stable when cooperation does not matter Result 5 is very similar to Result 3: a departure from a first-best management strategy can help to stabilize larger coalitions. Now, however, compromising on the compatibility of measures does not allow stabilizing the grand coalition, as this was possible when restricting the scope of cooperation, but only allows to stabilize a two-player coalition at best. The parameter space for which the two-player coalition can be stabilized can be substantially increased through lowering the value of  . The representative example in 
Overall Result
We now pull the results from the first and second stage together. In view of the numerous international fisheries conventions that emphasize the importance of the compatibility of measures, Result 6 suggests that conclusions may be different if we explicitly account for strategic aspects of free-riding. Again, to find the optimal departure from first-best, i.e. the value of  that maximizes global welfare, we have to realize that global welfare is a non-continuous step function of the parameter  . This is illustrated for the representative example in Table IV . Apparently, a high value of  leads to higher aggregated payoffs but may not allow to stabilize a non-trivial RFMO.   ) can improve upon an unrestricted, and in these cases, the optimal  implies the two player coalition in 93% and the grand coalition in 7% of the cases with an average optimal degree of compatibility of 0.4   .
Conclusion
The Interestingly, the qualitative results of both "inconsistent" scenarios have been quite similar and hence our conclusions appear quite robust. For any given RFMO membership, inconsistency has a negative impact, either measured in biological terms (fish stocks) or economic terms (payoffs). However, inconsistency can also have a positive impact on membership in that it can "buy" additional membership.
Inconsistency, i.e. second-or third-best designs of treaties, de facto means to put less pressure on RFMO members to reduce their fishing efforts in order to preserve fish stocks. In other words, less is required from governments when joining an RFMO, either in terms of giving up their sovereignty or in terms of choosing compatible and consistent management strategies, as an RFMO member, but also as an authority controlling fishing in several jurisdictions, including EEZs and the high seas. Those less ambitious objectives reduce the free-rider incentive, helping to establish larger stable participation in RFMOs. It has been shown that -at least in theory -an "optimal degree of inconsistency" can be determined for this trade-off between the level of ambition and participation, which maximizes global economic rents of stable RFMOs.
In the light of our result, many current suboptimal forms of fishery management may be less harmful than commonly perceived. Clearly, this does not question the normative benchmark of first-best fishery management, but only points to the fact that as long as free-riding cannot be effectively controlled by a global authority, a bird in hand may be more valuable than two in the bushes. This also suggests that in developing treaties, the main focus should be first on encouraging large participation and only later on deepening treaties in terms of their objectives.
For future research several topics come to mind. Our assumption about the migration pattern covers a large group of fish species, but there remain some species which may be better captured by different assumptions, e.g. linear migration patterns. It would be interesting to find out whether our qualitative conclusions would carry over to such alternative assumptions. Furthermore, it would be interesting to test our theory with empirical data. For our model, this would require a quite detailed and comprehensive data set, rarely available on international fisheries. Also the prospects of marine protected areas (i.e. nature reserve with no or restricted fishing, like analyzed in Punt et al. 2012) 
